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Abstract
Despite the evidence on incomplete financial markets and substantial risk being borne
by innovators, current models of growth through creative destruction predominantly model
innovators’ as risk neutral. Risk aversion is expected to reduce the incentive to innovate
and we might fear that without insurance innovation completely disappears in the long
run. The present paper introduces risk averse agents into an occupational choice model
of endogenous growth in which insurance against failure to innovate is not available. We
derive a clear negative relationship between the level of risk aversion and long run growth.
Surprisingly, we show that in an equilibrium there exists a cut-o↵ value of risk aversion
below which the growth rate of the mass of innovators tends to a strictly positive constant.
In this case, innovation persists on the long run and consumption per capita grows at a
strictly positive rate. On the other hand, for levels of risk aversion above the cut-o↵ of
value, the economy eventually stagnates.
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1 Introduction
The outcome of the individual process of innovation is inevitably uncertain, and modern models
of growth through creative destruction allow for such uncertainty. However, despite the fact
there is wide evidence that agents are risk averse, these models assume that investment in R&D
is not associated to any risk1. Common arguments for this simplification are that the risk
inherent in performing R&D can either be perfectly hedged against, or that R&D is performed
by risk neutral firms. In fact, perfect insurance against R&D risk is theoretically unlikely, due
to problems of asymmetric information between innovators and investors, and/or problems of
moral hazard (Akerlof (1970), Arrow (1962)). Empirically, a funding gap for R&D has been
well-documented even for developed economies, especially for small and new firms (for recent
surveys, see Hall (2002) or Hall and Lerner (2010)2), and capital markets appear to be imperfect,
see, e.g., Card et al. (2007)3.
The rate of technological progress and consequently the growth rate of consumption per
capita crucially depend on the resources devoted to innovation. Without perfect capital markets
to finance R&D, the level of risk aversion of agents is likely to impact on the allocation of
resources and on the economy’s long-run growth rate. The aim of the present paper is to
analyze the extent of this impact.
Our model is based on Eaton and Kortum (2001) and Kortum (1997). Agents are born
with an endowment of labor that they supply inelastically at birth. The length of an agent’s
life is uncertain. Following Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985), each agent faces a constant
Poisson death rate. A fraction of the labor endowment is specific and can only be supplied
to the production of output. Agents face a discrete occupational choice about the supply of
their remaining labor: They can either work in the production sector, or become researchers.
While the wage in the production sector is certain, the returns of a researcher are uncertain,
1See, e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991b), Kortum (1997), Segerstrom (1998)
and Segerstrom et al. (1990) for a non-exhaustive list.
2Further examples include Evans and Jovanovic (1989) who find evidence that wealth is positively linked
to the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur, and Caggese (2012), who empirically estimates that increased
uncertainty has a large negative e↵ect on risky investments by entrepreneurial firms.
3Incidentally, in neoclassical growth models, e↵ects of imperfect insurance of income risk on growth have been
analyzed quite extensively. See, e.g., Aiyagari (1994), Angeletos (2007), and the references therein. Generally,
the literature has shown that while labor income risk increases precautionary savings, capital income risk can
have an ambiguous e↵ect on savings. In Aghion et al. (2010), tighter credit lowers mean growth through its e↵ect
on the cyclical composition of investment.
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and in particular, an unsuccessful researcher does not earn any return. Successful researchers
are compensated with the expected present value of their innovation4. Agents can smooth
their consumption through saving, but as their entire income occurs at the beginning of their
lives, they are unable to borrow. The assumption of a single income simplifies the analysis
considerably, and allows us to abstract from wealth e↵ects in the occupational choice decision.
The lack of insurance with respect to research success allows us to derive a clear and stark
relationship between risk aversion and growth. We derive a cut-o↵ value of risk aversion above
which the economy stagnates. Consequently, there exists an upper bound on the stock of
research and on average consumption per capita. These bounds are decreasing in the level of
risk aversion. However, at or below this cut-o↵ value, stagnation is not an equilibrium. On
an asymptotically balanced growth path, both average consumption per capita and the level of
technology grow without bounds. For levels of risk aversion strictly below the cut-o↵, on an
asymptotically balanced growth path the measure of researchers will grow at a positive rate in
the long run. This rate is increasing in the rate of population growth, though strictly below
it, and decreasing in the level of risk aversion. To summarize, while risk aversion does indeed
depress the growth rate of the economy compared to a risk neutral setting, even without any
form of insurance complete stagnation of the economy does not necessarily occur.
The cut-o↵ value we derive corresponds to a coe cient of relative risk aversion of unity.
Empirically, the value of the coe cient of risk aversion (which in our model is the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution) is still debated. Many authors such as Campbell
(1999), Kocherlakota (1996), Patterson and Pesaran (1992), Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio
(2003), Alan and Browning (2010) or Alan et al. (2009) estimate coe cients of risk aversion
well above unity, or equivalently, elasticities of substitutions below unity. See also Attanasio
and Weber (2010) for a recent survey. On the other hand, Mulligan (2002) or Gruber (2006)
estimate elasticities of substitution above unity, while the results of Gourinchas and Parker
(2002) and Yogo (2004) are inconclusive. While our model remains agnostic about the empirical
value of risk aversion, it does stress that the qualitative behavior of the economy in the long
run critically depends on it.
4An important aspect in the innovation and patent literature is the question of appropriability of innovations.
In our model, a successful innovator can perfectly reap the benefits of his innovation.
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Our model belongs to the endogenous growth literature5, and it is not our aim to provide
a comprehensive review of this literature here. Within this literature, it is most closely related
to recent contributions by Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa and Wen (2008) and Zeira (2011), both of which
model risk averse agents in occupational choice models6. Zeira (2011) models the endogenous
formation of patent races for innovations of di↵erent levels of di culty. In an extension, he
introduces a model with finitely-lived agents and logarithmic utility in which some form of
insurance is granted to innovators by assuming that they always work a fraction of their time
in the production sector. He shows that risk aversion can lead to over-researching of “easy”
innovations, as these are less risky, where riskiness is defined not over innovative success, but
over winning the patent race. As such, both the environment and the question studied di↵er
substantially from our paper. While Zeira focuses on the allocation of resources into di↵erent
types of innovation, we study the choice between a production and a research sector. Foremost,
however, the main contribution of our paper lies in deriving the relationship between the level
of risk aversion and its qualitative e↵ects on the economy (stagnation vs. growth). As in Zeira
the level of risk aversion is fixed to unity, such a relationship is not derived.
Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa and Wen (2008) are the closest to our own model, as their paper focuses on
the e↵ects of redistributive taxation on growth and inequality if agents are risk averse. They
show that through insurance e↵ects, redistributive taxes may indeed increase growth. This
result is driven by the same intuition underlying our own results; the redistributive tax acts as
a social insurance for unsuccessful innovators. The innovation process they model is built on
Aghion and Howitt (1992), i.e. in contrast to us, they consider fixed inventive steps, a constant
population, and the probability to innovate is independent of the stock of ideas. This implies that
their model shares the prediction of strong scale e↵ects of Aghion and Howitt (1992), and the
growth rate of the economy is an increasing function of the number of researchers. As such, any
variable that impacts the level of research, also impacts the growth rate of the economy. Within
our model, we can separate e↵ects on levels from e↵ects on growth rates. Most importantly,
Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa and Wen (2008) focus on the importance of redistribution on growth, while our
5Such as Romer (1986), Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992),Grossman and Helpman (1991b), Segerstrom
(1998), Jones (1995), Jones (2005), Kremer (1993), or Alcala´ and Ciccone (2004), for a non-exhaustive list. Some
very good overviews of the main theories of endogenous growth can be found in, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(2003), Grossman and Helpman (1991a), Aghion and Howitt (1998) and more recently Acemoglu (2009).
6Also related, though not dealing with risk aversion as such, are Cozzi and Giordani (2011), who study
ambiguity aversion of innovators and find that higher ambiguity aversion leads to lower R&D e↵orts.
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focus is on the interplay between risk aversion and the occurrence or lack of long-run growth.
Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa and Wen (2008) exclusively consider values of risk aversion that are below the
cut-o↵ value above which we find that the economy stagnates. We instead, are able to show
that the existence of long-run growth hinges critically on the value of risk aversion.
Finally, our model is related, albeit less closely, to work on inequality in wealth and occupa-
tional choice under imperfect capital markets, such as Banerjee and Newman (1991), Banerjee
and Newman (1993), and Galor and Zeira (1993)7. While we share with this literature the
assumption of imperfect capital markets, conceptually we di↵er substantially. In the above lit-
erature, imperfect capital markets a↵ect outcomes because agents are ex ante heterogeneous in
wealth. In our model, agents are homogeneous in endowments and the lack of capital markets
a↵ects the growth rate through a lack of insurance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the optimization
problem of consumers in the economy, while section 3 details the production side of the economy,
including the innovation process and the value of R&D. Our results on equilibrium growth rates
are derived in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Consumers
2.1 Endowments
The economy is populated by a mass Lt of agents. Following Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985),
each agent faces a Poisson death rate of   2 (0,1)8. Each agent is endowed with 1+ o units of
labor, which he supplies inelastically at the instant he is born, ⌧ . Out of his labor endowment,
o units are production-specific, and can only be supplied in the production of consumption
goods9. The agent chooses between supplying his remaining one unit of labor in the production
7See also Aghion and Bolton (1997), Ghatak and Jiang (2002), or Mookherjee and Ray (2003) and the
references therein.
8The introduction of a death rate is in itself innocuous. We do not wish to model infinitely lived agents who
make repeated work/research decision at each t, among other reasons as in such a setup it is di cult to justify
that agents would be incapable of borrowing against their future (expected) income.
9This assumption implies that unsuccessful researchers have a minimum income out of which they can con-
sume.
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of consumption goods and becoming a researcher10. Income in production is certain and the
wage rate is unity11. The pay-o↵ from being a researcher is uncertain.
Successful researchers are those with an idea whose e ciency surpasses the current state of
the art; we denote such ideas as innovations. The probability to innovate has two terms. First,
it depends on the probability that an idea arrives to the researcher, which is a Poisson Process
with an exogenous arrival rate of ↵. Second, on the probability that e ciency of the idea is
above the state of the art, which is determined endogenously in the model.
Successful researchers are compensated with the expected value of their innovation. This is
increasing in the e ciency improvement that the innovation represents, relative to the previous
state of the art, and in the expected length that the innovation itself will remain the state of
the art12. Unsuccessful researchers have zero income apart from the wage return of their o units
of labor they supply for production.
2.2 Preferences and budget sets
Agents are risk averse and aggregate the available goods in a Cobb-Douglas fashion. They
cannot borrow. This very strict borrowing constraint arises naturally in the current setup in
which expected future income of any agent after his birth is zero. Agents in debt would never
be able to repay their debts. A less restrictive setup would equip agents with a unit flow of
labor at each t. However, allowing for the possibility of multiple innovations during a lifetime
would severely complicate the utility maximization problem, and distract from our focus of the
e↵ect of risk aversion without insurance.13
However, agents can save any unconsumed income to smooth consumption over their (ex-
pected) lifetime. We assume that there exists a financial intermediary that acts as an economy-
wide mutual fund, and that holds the ownership claims of all firms that operate in the economy.
10Units of labor are indivisible in our model.
11The increased e ciency in production through research will translate into lower prices and increase the real
wages of production workers.
12Our equilibrium properties are not a↵ected if we assume instead that the compensation paid to the innovator
depends on the realized e ciency improvement of his innovation
13We would have to keep track of all past decisions of agents, as well as whether their past research had been
successful. See, e.g., Levhari and Srinivasan (1969), Merton (1969), or Samuelson (1969). Note that the natural
borrowing constraint of a finitely lived agent would be zero also in this case, as the worst possible outcome would
be for an agent to always be an unsuccessful researcher.
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This fund plays two roles. Its first role is in re-allocating resources between agents and firms,
and over time. It enables agents to deposit their income, in return for interest payments, which
allows them to smooth their consumption over their expected lifetime. Upon receiving their
income in ⌧ , each agent i deposits his income with the intermediary. We denote deposits as
Ai⌧ |⌧ . Deposited income pays an interest of rt, which is the rate at which future profits of firms
are discounted. Accruing profits are used to pay interests on deposits and to satisfy withdrawals
made for consumption. In this way, the intermediary re-allocates the resources across agents at
each t, and the resource constraint of the economy implies that the entire production is con-
sumed each t. The second role of the fund is as an intermediary between researchers and firms.
Researchers who have found an innovation can sell this to the fund for its present expected
value, which gets credited to their deposits with the fund. The intermediary then gives the right
to use the innovation in production to a firm. In this way, the only aspect in which workers,
successful researchers, and unsuccessful researchers di↵er, is in their initial deposits, Ai⌧ |⌧ , with
the fund.
Due to uncertain lifetimes, an agent typically will die while holding positive deposits with
the intermediary, and we assume that his deposits become property of the intermediary on this
occasion. Death occurs with probability   at t, independent of an agent’s current age. As this
is the flow rate with which the agent loses his assets, the intermediary will compensate him
for this risk by paying him a return of rt +   on his deposits. Under these assumptions, the
maximization problem of agent i born at time ⌧ can be expressed as
Ui⌧ = E⌧
264Z 1
⌧
e (⇢+ )(t ⌧)
h
exp
R 1
0 ln xit|⌧ (j)dj
i1  
  1
1    dt
375 (1)
where xit|⌧ (j) is the quantity that agent i, born at ⌧ , consumes of good j at time t. ⇢ is
the subjective discounting factor, which is assumed to be constant. Future consumption is
discounted both by this factor as well as   as this gives the rate at which future consumption
is lost due to death. The level of risk aversion is given by     0. The individual maximizes (1)
subject to the following constraints:
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a˙it|⌧ = (rt +     P˙tPt )ait|⌧  Xit|⌧ , (2a)
ait|⌧   0, Xit|⌧   0, (2b)
lim
t!1e
 (r¯t⌧+   P˙P t⌧ )(t ⌧)ait|⌧ = 0, (2c)
where
P˙
P t⌧
⌘ 1
t  ⌧
tZ
⌧
P˙s
Ps
ds and
r¯t⌧ ⌘ 1
t  ⌧
tZ
⌧
rs ds
are the average growth rate of the price index and the average interest rate between t and
⌧ respectively. ait|⌧ is the amount of savings the agent has deposited at t in real terms, i.e.,
ait|⌧ =
Ait|⌧
Pt
, Pt is the aggregate price index in the economy and Xit|⌧ is the consumption index
of agent i. The initial deposits that an agent has, Ai⌧ |⌧ , depends on his choice of occupation. It is
equal to 1+o if he works in production, equal to the expected value of the innovation (V⌧ , which
will be determined later) plus o if he is a successful researcher, and o if he is an unsuccessful
researcher. If an idea arrives that surpasses the technological frontier, innovation is immediate.
Note that the uncertainty about the initial amount of deposits is the only uncertainty that the
agent faces. Once this is resolved, his lifetime utility becomes certain. The values of deposits
and consumption at each t depend on when an agent is born, and are therefore indexed by the
cohort ⌧ .
2.3 Individual and aggregate demand
The problem of maximizing (1) subject to the constraints in (2) is entirely standard. Agents first
decide how to allocate their income across their expected lifetime and then, given the allocation
of income, decide how to allocate expenditure across varieties of goods. Let the optimal price
and consumption indices be
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Pt = exp
1Z
0
ln pt(j) dj (3)
and
Xit|⌧ = exp
1Z
0
ln xit|⌧ (j) dj. (4)
respectively.
Then the first order conditions yield the familiar Euler Equation
X˙it|⌧
Xit|⌧
=
1
 
"
rt   ⇢  P˙t
Pt
#
. (5)
and consumption at every t can be expressed as
Xit|⌧ =
ait|⌧
µt
, (6)
where
µt =
Z 1
t
exp{[(1  1/ )
⇣
P˙
P st
  r¯st
⌘
  ⇢/     ](s  t)} ds. (7)
Note that in the case of   = 1, µt simplifies considerably, to µt =
1
⇢+  . All agents of cohort
⌧ consume according to (6), regardless of their occupation. The only factor in which their
consumption plans di↵er is the amount of initial deposits, ai⌧ |⌧ .
Given equations (5) and (6), consumption at any point in time can be expressed as
Xit|⌧ =
ai⌧ |⌧
µ⌧
· e 1  (r¯t⌧ ⇢  P˙P t⌧ )(t ⌧) (8)
3 Supply
3.1 Production and innovation
The production and innovation side of the economy is a closed economy version of the model
introduced by Eaton and Kortum (2001). Minor changes with respect to this paper are our
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introduction of initial labor endowments o, the fact that at each t only newly-born agents
are active, and the introduction of an initial technology level, T0. Here, we summarize the
main results of Eaton and Kortum (2001) for convenience under these adjustments. Detailed
derivations and proofs can be found in the original paper.
Time is continuous. The economy produces at each t a continuum of goods, indexed by
j 2 [0, 1]. Labor is the only input in production. How many units of good j can be produced
with a unit input of labor depends on the highest e ciency level in production, z(j), and di↵ers
across goods j. z(j) represents the state of the art of production in sector j, and {z(j)|j 2 [0, 1]}
is referred to as the technological frontier of the economy. The frontier is common knowledge.
Innovative activity in the economy is focused on expanding this frontier.
Firms turn labor input into consumption goods, and compete a` la Bertrand. The wage is
the numeraire. In each sector j, there will be a single active firm that can use an idea with
e ciency q(j) > z(j) and make positive profits by charging the marginal costs of the competitor
producing with e ciency z(j), 1z(j)
14.
Researchers obtain ideas about how to produce goods more e ciently. Let Rt denote the
measure of researchers at t, and let
Rt =  tnLt, (9)
i.e.,  t is the fraction of the active population that are researchers. Denote the growth rate
of researchers as gt. To each researcher, ideas arrive as a Poisson process with parameter ↵15.
Therefore, the stock of ideas (i.e., the level of technology) evolves according to
T˙t = ↵Rt, (10)
and
Tt = ↵
tZ
0
Rs ds+ T0, (11)
14We assume that if consumers are faced with identical prices for goods produced with di↵erent e ciency
levels, they will always buy the good with the higher e ciency level.
15This parameter can be seen as the e ciency of research.
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where T0 is the initial level of technology.
Research is undirected, and e ciencies of new ideas, q(j), are drawn from the Pareto distri-
bution, H(q) = 1  q ✓, which is the same for all sectors16.
Under these assumptions, Eaton and Kortum (2001) derive the technological frontier, link
it to production costs, and as prices are set to marginal costs are able to show that the price
index is itself a function of production costs, and can be expressed as a function of the stock of
research,
Pt =   T
 1/✓
t , (12)
where   is Euler’s constant. It follows that:
P˙t
Pt
=  1
✓
T˙t
Tt
, (13)
i.e., the overall price index decreases at a rate that is proportional to the rate of technological
progress in the economy.
3.2 Profits and value of R&D
Profits from improvements in the technological frontier determine the value of an innovation.
Eaton and Kortum (2001) show that total profits of firms, ⇧t, can be expressed as a function of
total expenditure in the economy and the distribution of the inventive step m of new ideas, as
these determine the markups over costs. They also show that this distribution, H(m), is Pareto
and independent of time.
Let Yt =
tR
0
R
i
yit|⌧ di d⌧ be total expenditure at time t. Given that the markups, m’s, are
drawn from H(m), total profits at t are
⇧t = Yt
1Z
0
[1 m(j) 1] dj = Yt
1Z
1
(1 m 1) dH(m) = Yt
1 + ✓
. (14)
Total expenditure at t is equal to consumption, which is equal to total output, Yt, which in
turn is the sum of total profit and total wage income in the economy at t. Total wage income
16The parameter ✓ > 1 governs the variation in e ciencies of production.
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depends on the measure of individuals who choose to work in the production sector. Individuals
only earn income the moment they are born, ⌧ . The measure of agents that are born at time t
is nLt. Out of these, a fraction (1   t) will work in the production sector. Given the wage and
additional labor endowments, o, total income in the economy is
Yt = (1   t + o)nLt + Yt
1 + ✓
=
1 + ✓
✓
(1   t + o)nLt.
(15)
The value of an innovation, Vt, is equal to the present discounted value of the future streams
of profits that it grants. Apart from profit flows, ⇧t =
Yt
1+✓ , this value has to take into account
the discount rate (rt), the change in price level, and the probability of the profit flows ending.
Patent rights to an innovation become void at any s > t if a better idea arrives, which occurs
with probability Tt/Ts. This implies that the value of an innovation is given by
Vt =
Pt
1 + ✓
1Z
t
e r¯st(s t)
Ys
Ps
Tt
Ts
ds =
Pt
✓
1Z
t
e r¯st(s t)
(1   s + o)nLs
Ps
Tt
Ts
ds. (16)
Finally, combining (15) and (12) yields average consumption per capita at t, which is in-
creasing in the stock of ideas:
xt =
Yt/Lt
Pt
=
1+✓
✓ (1   t + o)n
 T 1/✓t
. (17)
Both the value of an innovation, (16), and consumption per capita, (17), di↵er from their
respective values in Eaton and Kortum (2001) through additional labor endowments, o, and the
fact that only a fraction n of the total population is earning any income at time t.
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Labor market optimality
Denote by Wt the utility of working in the production sector and by EUt the expected utility
of research. Initial assets can take three distinct values, i) 1 + o if agent i works in production,
12
ii) V⌧ + o if agent i is a successful researcher, and iii) o if agent i is an unsuccessful researcher.
Combining equations (8) and (7) for consumption at time ⌧ and using the appropriate level of
initial assets, for all ⌧ 2 t,
W⌧ =
8>>><>>>:
1
1   
"✓
1 + o
P⌧
◆1  
µ ⌧   1⇢+  
#
if   6= 1 and     0,
1
⇢+  
[ln(1 + o)  ln(P⌧ ) + ln(⇢+  )] + I⌧ if   = 1,
(18)
and
EU⌧ =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1
1   
⇢
↵
T⌧
⇣
V⌧+o
P⌧
⌘1  
µ ⌧   1⇢+ 
 
+
✓
1  ↵
T⌧
◆⇣
o
P⌧
⌘1  
µ ⌧   1⇢+ 
  
if   6= 1 and     0,
↵
T⌧

ln(V⌧ + o)  ln(P⌧ ) + ln(⇢+  )
⇢+  
+ I⌧
 
+
+
✓
1  ↵
T⌧
◆
ln(o)  ln(P⌧ ) + ln(⇢+  )
⇢+  
+ I⌧
 
if   = 1,
(19)
where I⌧ ⌘
1R
⌧
(r¯t⌧   ⇢  P˙P t⌧ )(t  ⌧)e (⇢+ )(t ⌧) dt.
Define Et =
EUt
Wt
as the expected utility of research relative to working in the production
sector at time t. This measure determines the agents’ choice between R&D and work. In
particular, the labor market allocation is optimal for all agents if
Rt =
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if Et < 1 and 0     1,
0 if Et > 1 and   > 1,
2 [0, Lt] if Et = 1,
Lt if Et > 1 and 0     1,
Lt if Et < 1 and   > 1.
(20)
The optimal labor market allocation is determined by the path of research stock, {Tt}, which
in turn determines the evolution of the price level, the expected value of an innovation, and the
probability to innovate. The path of research stock is an equilibrium if it yields the path of
research, {Rt}, necessary to generate it.
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4.2 Interest rate
In endogenous growth models of the type on which our model is based on, the economy typically
exhibits a balanced growth path along which both the fraction of researchers in the economy,
 , and the interest rate, r, are constant. Our first result establishes that the constancy of the
interest rate indeed hinges on the fact that the fraction of researchers is constant over time.
Lemma 1. On any equilibrium path such that the average growth rate of researchers converges
to a constant, lim
t!1 g¯st = g, the average interest rate between t and s   t converges to a constant,
lim
t!1 r¯st =
g
✓
(2    1) +  n+ ⇢. (21)
If on the equilibrium path  t =   holds for all finite t   tˆ   0, r¯st = g✓ (2    1) +  n + ⇢
holds for all s   t   tˆ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The convergence result in Lemma 1 relies on the fact that for any constant growth rate
of researchers, g, the fraction of researchers will converge to a constant. In particular,  t will
converge to zero if g < n     and may take any value   in the limit if the growth rate of
researchers converges to g = n   . For finite t, a constant interest rate is again conditional on
 t =  , which in finite time can only occur if either gt = n    or Rt = 0 for all t.
Under risk neutral preferences, an equilibrium path exists on which gt = n   and  t =   > 0
for all t. It is not obvious that such an equilibrium path also exists with risk averse agents.
However, Lemma 1 establishes that the interest rate will converge to a constant for a large class
of research growth rates. For any level of risk aversion   and limit growth rate of researchers
g, there exists a private discount factor ⇢ such that the interest rate converges to a constant in
the long run that is large enough to ensure that the expected value of an innovation is finite.
4.3 Growth rate of researchers
We are now in a position to derive the equilibrium path of the economy.
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Definition 1. Given initial values of the stock of research and the labor force, T0 and L0, as
well as population growth rate n   0 and death rate     0, with n    , an equilibrium is a path
of the stock of research, {Tt}, such that for all t: (i) the stock of research evolves according to
equation (10), (ii) the path of research satisfies (20), (iii) the price level satisfies equation (12),
(iv), the expected value of an innovation satisfies equation (16), (v) the probability to innovate
is ↵/Tt, and (vi) consumption demand is equal to output.
As the interest of this paper is to identify the e↵ect of risk aversion on occupational choice
decisions and hence research growth, we first derive the equilibrium of our model for risk neutral
agents,   = 0.
Lemma 2. Let   = 0. The economy exhibits a balanced growth path along which the measure
of researchers grows at rate g = n    and average consumption per capita grows at rate g✓ .
Proof. See Appendix B
The derivations of equilibrium are standard and straightforward if g = n   . In particular,
we know that the interest rate is constant over time and our model trivially yields the same
results with respect to research as Eaton and Kortum (2001). Lemma 2 reiterates known results
that neither the introduction of work-specific labor endowments, nor the perpetual-youth aspect
of the model a↵ect the steady-state properties of the model. Any di↵erences in the equilibrium
research path in our model are therefore entirely due to risk aversion of agents. We find that,
compared to the case of risk neutral agents, the introduction of risk aversion leads to non-
trivial alterations in the equilibrium properties of the economy. Indeed, the economy exhibits
qualitatively di↵erent equilibria, depending on the exact level of risk aversion.
Theorem 1. Assume that   > 1 and denote T¯ = ↵ 1
1 ( 1+oo )
1   . The behavior of research on an
equilibrium path depends on the initial stock of research, T0:
1. If T0   T¯ , there exists a unique equilibrium path of research such that Rt = 0 8 t.
2. If T0 < T¯ , Rt = 0 for every t is not an equilibrium; some research will be undertaken at
some t. Tt is then increasing, and T¯ is the maximum stock of research that can be reached
in the economy.
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Proof. See Appendix C
Theorem 1 establishes that there exists a clear cut-o↵ value of  , i.e.,   = 1, above which
growth in the economy eventually stagnates. There exists an upper level of technology above
which the economy can never grow. The qualitative result is particularly strong as it does not
depend on the exact level of risk aversion  , nor on how much exogenous “security” agents
have through their labor endowments o. These parameters impact the level of T¯ , but not the
qualitative result of eventual stagnation. However, it is straightforward to show that the level
of T¯ is increasing in both ↵ and o, and decreasing in  . This result is in stark contrast to the
qualitative equilibrium behavior of the economy if 0 <    1, as we now show.
Lemma 3. Assume 0 <    1. Along an equilibrium path of research, it cannot be that
lim
t!1Tt = T . There does not exist a t0 such that for all t > t0, Rt = 0.
Proof. See Appendix C
Lemma 3 shows that for low enough values of risk aversion, some research will be undertaken,
and in particular, on an equilibrium path there does not exist an upper bound on the stock of
research. The proof, given in full in Appendix C, proceeds by contradiction. We show that
there exists no finite value of T to which Tt may converge, such that a path of research along
which the measure of researchers converges to zero will be an equilibrium. Unfortunately, while
we are able to establish that low levels of risk aversion imply that research does never cease
altogether, it is not obvious how the equilibrium research path looks for finite t. By Lemma 1,
we know that a constant growth rate of researchers will lead to a constant interest rate in finite
time only if either no research is undertaken at all, or if the growth rate of researchers is equal
to the population growth rate. The latter, however, can be shown to violate the optimal labor
market allocation17. Consequently, even if an equilibrium path of research exists along which
the measure of researchers grows at a constant rate (possibly zero or negative), the interest rate
on this path will not be constant, and it is not obvious how the expected value of an innovation
evolves on this path. We are able instead to make additional statements on the asymptotic
behavior of the economy. We begin by defining the concept of an asymptotically balanced
growth path.
17The proof of this statement is trivial and therefore omitted. Setting g = n   ,    , and rt = r in the labor
market optimality condition (20), it is straightforward to show that the utility of research relative to work, Et,
is decreasing over time.
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Definition 2. Let a path of research {Rt} and average consumption per capita {xt} be an equi-
librium path. This path is an asymptotically balanced growth path if lim
t!1 gt = g and limt!1
x˙t
xt
= x˙x .
As we know from Lemma 1 that the interest rate converges to a constant whenever gt ! g,
we can state the properties of an asymptotically balanced growth path.
Theorem 2. Assume that the economy is on an asymptotically balanced growth path. On this
path, the level of risk aversion a↵ects the growth rate of researchers as follows:
1. If 0 <   < 1, in long run equilibrium it must be that the growth rate of researchers
converges to g = (1    )(n    ) > 0. Both the measure of researchers, Rt, and the stock
of ideas, Tt, grow without bounds.
2. If   = 1, in long run equilibrium it must be that the measure of researchers is a strictly pos-
itive constant. The stock of ideas, Tt, grows without bounds, but its growth rate converges
to zero.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The long run equilibrium results of Theorem 2 show that along an asymptotically balanced
growth path, the measure of researchers will always be strictly positive, and their growth rate
converges to a constant. In line with our result that growth ceases if   > 1, Theorem 2 shows
that also for    1, research activity in equilibrium is, in the long run, decreasing in  . For
  < 1, the growth rate of researchers on the asymptotically balanced growth path is strictly
decreasing in  , while for   = 1, the measure of researchers on this path converges to a constant.
Note that the growth rate of researchers is never a↵ected by the labor endowments o that are
supplied in production. Growth rates are only ever a↵ected by the value of  , and the growth
rate of the population. However, we show in Appendix D that for   = 1, the measure of
researchers to which Rt converges in the long run is strictly increasing in o.
4.4 Consumption per capita
Average consumption per capita is given by equation (17), i.e.,
xt =
1 + ✓
✓
(1   t + o)n 1
 
T 1/✓t (22)
and its growth rate is
x˙t
xt
=    ˙t
1   t +
1
✓
T˙t
Tt
. (23)
The following results on the growth rate and the level of xt follow immediately from our
results on the equilibrium research path derived in the preceding section.
Corollary 1. 1. Assume 0 <    1 and that the economy is on an asymptotically balanced
growth path. On this path,
lim
t!1xt =1
lim
t!1
x˙t
xt
=
(1   )(n   )
✓
.
2. If   > 1, there exists a maximum level of average consumption per capita, which depends
on T¯ = ↵
1 ( 1+oo )
1   :
xt =
1 + ✓
✓
(1 + o)n
1
 
T¯ 1/✓
Corollary 1 implies that the qualitative results on the e↵ect of risk aversion on the path of
research translate one for one into impacts on average consumption per capita. In particular,
average consumption per capita grows without bounds if    1, and is bounded if   > 1. At the
cut-o↵ value of   = 1, the stock of research, and hence average consumption per capita grows
without bounds. However, as the measure of researchers converges to a constant in this case,
growth is linear, and the growth rate of xt converges to zero. Finally, as xt depends on Tt, we
observe level e↵ects of increasing risk aversion even if   > 1. An increase in   lowers T¯ and
therefore lowers the maximum level of average consumption per capita that can be achieved.
5 Conclusions
The vast majority of the work on endogenous growth shares the assumption that agents are
risk neutral. While this is a valid assumption under perfect capital markets, problems of either
asymmetric information or moral hazard are likely to prohibit perfect capital markets, a result
that is theoretically plausible and supported by empirical evidence. Lacking perfect capital
18
markets, the natural aversion to risk characterizing individual innovators is expected to a↵ect
the conclusions obtained with traditional endogenous growth models with risk neutral agents.
In our paper risk averse agents are introduced in a model of occupational choice based on
Eaton and Kortum (2001) and Kortum (1997). Under risk neutrality in these models, consump-
tion growth per capita ultimately depends on the population growth rate and technological
parameters. The equilibrium balanced growth path encompasses a constant fraction of the
population to become researchers. Risk averse agents will clearly be more hesitant to engage
into innovation. We show that the equilibrium balanced growth path results of, e.g., Eaton
and Kortum (2001) and Kortum (1997), do not hold for risk averse agents that cannot insure
themselves. No matter the level of risk aversion, an equilibrium path on which the measure of
researchers grows at the same rate as population does not exist. This result implies that there
exists no steady state in which consumption per capita would grow at a constant rate in finite
time. Given these results, we could expect that innovation would in the long run completely
disappear. Instead we show that even with risk averse agents and complete lack of insurance
against failure in innovation, there exists a cut-o↵ value of risk aversion below which a positive
growth rate of researchers in the long run is compatible with an asymptotically balanced growth
path. Indeed, if an equilibrium exists, it must be that on the equilibrium path the growth rates
of researchers and of the stock of ideas converge to a positive constant for low levels of risk
aversion. We find that the value of this growth rate depends positively on population growth
and negatively on the level of risk aversion. For agents with risk aversion above the cut-o↵, the
stock of ideas approaches a constant, and no innovation takes place anymore once this level is
reached. However, the level of this stock of ideas itself depends negatively on the level of risk
aversion. As average consumption per capita in equilibrium depends on the stock of ideas, this
cut-o↵ along an equilibrium path is also observed in the growth rate (and level) of consumption
per capita.
The results of the paper highlight the negative e↵ect of risk aversion on growth but also show
that some innovation is still possible even in the complete absence of insurance markets. While
on an equilibrium path the fraction of researchers asymptotically converges to zero if insurance
does not exist, both the measure of researchers and the level of technology can grow without
bounds if risk aversion is low enough.
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A Interest rate derivation
As there exists no savings technology in the economy, the resource constraint requires that at
each point in time, all produced output is also consumed. By (15), output at t is given by
1
 
T 1/✓t
1 + ✓
✓
(1   t + o)nLt. (24)
From the consumers’ optimization problem, total consumption at time t is
Xt =
atR1
t exp{[(1  1/ )
   1✓ g¯st   r¯st   ⇢/     ](s  t)} ds (25)
where at it total wealth in the economy at time t, and we use the fact that the price level
is a function of the stock of research, and grows at rate   1✓gt. This, in turn, is equal to the
present discounted value of the future stream of income, adjusted for the price level,
at =
1Z
t
1
 
T 1/✓s e
 r¯st(s t) 1 + ✓
✓
(1   s + o)nLs ds. (26)
Equating (25) and (26), we find that the following condition needs to hold for the resource
constraint to be satisfied:
(1   t + o) =
1R
t
e[
1
✓ g¯st+n   r¯st](s t)(1   s + o) dsR1
t exp{[(1  1/ )
   1✓ g¯st   r¯st   ⇢/     ](s  t)} ds (27)
To prove Lemma 1, we first show that for any t   tˆ with tˆ   0, a constant average interest
rate is the equilibrium interest rate if either gt = g = n    or Rt = 0, i.e., gt = 0 and Rtˆ = 0.
To this end, note that for g = n    , the fraction of researchers is constant,  t =  , while if
Rtˆ = 0 and g = 0, for any t   tˆ,  t =  tˆ =   = 0. In either case, equation (27) becomesZ 1
t
e[ (1 1/ )(
g
✓+r¯st) ⇢/   ](s t) ds =
1Z
t
e[
g
✓+n   r¯st](s t) ds (28)
which holds i↵
 (1  1/ )
⇣g
✓
+ r¯st
⌘
  ⇢/      = g
✓
+ n      r¯st
r¯st =
g
✓
(2    1) +  n+ ⇢.
(29)
We proceed by showing that for any other value of g, the resource constraint is not satisfied
if r¯st = r. The argument is by contradiction. Suppose that gt = g 6= (n   ) and r¯st = r. Then,
equation (28) becomes
(1   t + o) =
1R
t
e[
g
✓+n   r](s t)(1   s + o) dsR1
t exp{[ (1  1/ )
  g
✓ + r
   ⇢/     ](s  t)} ds (30)
Only if either g = n    or Rt = 0 for all t do we observe that  t =  . For all other values
of g, the growth rate of  t is g  = g   (n   ). In this case, simplifying (30) leads to
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(1   t + o) 1
(1  1/ )   g✓ + r + ⇢/  +   = (1 + o) 1  g✓   (n   ) + r    t 1 g 1+✓✓ + r
(1 + o)
g
✓ (1/    2)  n+ 1  (r   ⇢)
[(1  1/ )   g✓ + r + ⇢/  +  ][r   g✓   (n   )] =  t
g
✓ (1/    2  ✓) + 1  r   ⇢     
[(1  1/ )   g✓ + r + ⇢/  +  ][r   g 1+✓✓ ]
(31)
As the right-hand side of (31) depends on time through  t, and the left-hand side does not, this
condition can only hold if the numerators of both the left- and the right-hand side are zero. The
numerator of the left-hand side of (31) is zero i↵
r =
g
✓
(2    1) + ⇢+  n, (32)
while the numerator of the right-hand side is zero i↵
r = ⇢+    +
g
✓
(2    1 + ✓ ). (33)
Combining (32) and (33), we find that they are equal only if g = n    , which contradicts our
original assumption. I.e., there exists no other constant value g other than n    (or zero research) for
which the interest rate is constant for finite t.
To prove the convergence result of the Lemma, note that if lim
t!1
gt = g, then lim
t!1
 t =   2 (0, 1),
where   = 1 if g > n    and   = 0 if g < n   . In this case, we can work with the limit of equation
(27), which is
lim
t!1
(1   t + o) =
lim
t!1
1R
t
e[
1
✓ g¯st+n   r¯st](s t)(1   s + o) ds
lim
t!1
1R
t
exp{[(1  1/ )    1✓ g¯st   r¯st   ⇢/     ](s  t)} ds
(1    + o) =
(1    + o)
1R
t
e
[ 1✓ limt!1 g¯st+n    limt!1 r¯st](s t) ds
1R
t
exp{[(1  1/ )
⇣
  1✓ limt!1 g¯st   limt!1 r¯st
⌘
  ⇢/     ](s  t)} ds
(34)
and
1Z
t
exp{[(1  1/ )
⇣
 g
✓
  lim
t!1
r¯st
⌘
  ⇢/     ](s  t)} ds =
1Z
t
e
[ 1✓ g+n    limt!1 r¯st](s t) ds (35)
which is identical to the condition in (28) except that it depends on the limit of r¯st rather than r¯st
itself. Consequently, equation (35) is satisfied i↵
lim
t!1
r¯st =
g
✓
(2    1) +  n+ ⇢. (36)
QED
B Equilibrium with risk neutrality
If agents are risk neutral, consumers will be indi↵erent to the allocation of consumption over time if
the interest rate is r = ⇢+ P˙tPt . In this case, it is trivial that all output will be consumed at each t. The
(expected) utilities of work and research are, respectively,
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Wt =
1 + o
Pt
  1
⇢+  
(37)
EUt =
↵
Tt
Vt
Pt
+
o
Pt
  1
⇢+ ⌫
(38)
and a labor allocation in which both workers and researchers are active is optimal if, Et = 1, i.e.,
1 =
↵
Tt
Vt (39)
It is straightforward to show that g = n    satisfies this equation. The value of an innovation, Vt,
is,
Vt =
(1    + o)nLt
✓
1Z
t
e[
1
✓ (n  ) r](s t) ds
=
(1    + o)n
✓r   (n   )Lt
=
(1    + o)n
✓⇢  2(n   )Lt
(40)
and Tt = T0e
(n  )t, i.e., labor market optimality is satisfied if
1 =
↵
T0
(1    + o)n
✓⇢  2(n   )L0. (41)
Finally, the growth rate of average consumption per capita, from equation (17), is g✓ . The economy
follows a balanced growth path with g = n   .
C Existence of (active) research equilibrium
Proof of Theorem 1:
For the proof of part 1 of Theorem 1, note that if   > 1, a research path of Rt = 0 for all t is an
optimal labor allocation if and only if for all t
↵
Tt
⇥
(Vt + o)
1     o1  ⇤+ o1   > (1 + o)1  
Tt > ↵
(Vt + o)
1     o1  
(1 + o)1     o1  
(42)
where the reversal of the sign is due to the fact that (1 + o)1     o1   < 0 if   > 1. For this condition
to be met for all t, it must be that it holds for the maximal value that the RHS can take. As with
Rt = 0, the value of an innovation is
Vt =
(1 + o)nLt
✓[r   (n   )] , (43)
the RHS of (42) is strictly increasing in t, and therefore reaches its maximum value as t!1, in which
case Rt = 0 for all t is an optimal labour market allocation if
Tt = T0   ↵ 1
1    1+oo  1   = T¯ . (44)
T¯ is the level of the stock of research such that agents are indi↵erent between research and work
only in the limit as t ! 1. For all finite t, if Tt   T¯ , agents strictly prefer to work over engaging in
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R&D. If the initial stock of research is at least T¯ and agents have “high” levels of risk aversion, the
probability to innovate is so small that no agent is ever willing to take that risk, and all agents always
choose to work in the production sector.
These derivations also show that for any Tt < T¯ , the equilibrium labor market condition for zero
research, (42), will be violated at some t. In particular, if we assume Rt = 0 for all t and
Tt = ↵
1
1    1+oo  1     ✏ (45)
with ✏ > 0, there exists a finite value of t, tˆ, at which the expected utility of research is identical to the
utility of work, which shows that for any t > tˆ, Rt = 0 is no labor market equilibrium:
↵
1
1    1+oo  1     ✏ = ↵
1 
h
(1+o)nLtˆ
o✓(r (n  )) + 1
i1  
1    1+oo  1  
1 
"
1 
✓
1 + o
o
◆1  # ✏
↵
= 1 

(1 + o)nLtˆ
o✓(r   (n   )) + 1
 1  
(1 + o)nLtˆ =
8<:
"
✏
↵
 
1 
✓
1 + o
o
◆1  !# 11  
  1
9=; o✓(r   (n   ))
tˆ =
1
n    ln
8<:
8<:
"
✏
↵
 
1 
✓
1 + o
o
◆1  !# 11  
  1
9=; o✓(r   (n   ))(1 + o)n
9=;
(46)
This result proves that as long as Tt < T¯ , some research will occur at some point in time, and
combined with our earlier result on the strict preference of work over research whenever Tt > T¯ , we
know that T¯ is the highest level of the stock of research that may be reached if   > 1. This completes
the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Lemma 3:
The proof of the Lemma is straightforward by contradiction. For lim
t!1
Tt = T to hold, it must be
that lim
t!1
Rt = 0. From Lemma 1, we know that if Rt ! 0, the fraction of researchers and the average
interest rate converge to constants. From equations (18) and 19, zero research constitutes an optimal
labor market allocation in the long run if
lim
t!1
↵
Tt
⇥
(Vt + o)
1   + o1  
⇤
< (1 + o)1   if   < 1, (47)
lim
t!1
↵
Tt
[ln(Vt + o) + ln(o)] < ln(1 + o)  ln(o) if   = 1. (48)
We know that with zero research in the limit, lim
t!1
Tt = T , and that the value of an innovation in
the limit is
Vt =
(1 + o)nLt
✓[r   (n   )] 8t   tˆ, (49)
which grows without bounds. This implies that (47) and (48) will be violated in the long run, and
we have reached a contradiction.
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D Growth rate of researchers
We prove theorem 2 by showing that no other paths of researchers are compatible with equilibrium in
the long run. It is easiest to consider the cases 0 <   < 1 and   = 1 separately:
Case 1: 0 <   < 1
Labor market allocation in the limit is optimal if
Rt =
8>><>>:
Lt if lim
t!1
↵(Vt+o)
1  
Tt
  lim
t!1
↵o1  
Tt
> (1 + o)1     o1  
2 [0, Lt] if lim
t!1
↵(Vt+o)
1  
Tt
  lim
t!1
↵o1  
Tt
= (1 + o)1     o1  
0 if lim
t!1
↵(Vt+o)
1  
Tt
  lim
t!1
↵o1  
Tt
< (1 + o)1     o1  
(50)
For any gt such that lim
t!1
gt = g, we know that:
lim
t!1
T˙t
Tt
= g (51)
lim
t!1
r¯st =
g
✓
(2    1) +  n+ ⇢ (52)
Making use of these convergence results in equation (16), the expected value of an innovation in the
limit is
lim
t!1
Vt =
(1 + o)nLt
✓[r   (n   ) + g(1  1✓ )]
  Rt
✓r   g , (53)
i.e., lim
t!1
Vt =1 if g < n   .
We already know that zero research at any t or as a limit will violate labor market optimality.
Now, we ascertain that a research path along which Rt = R0 or Rt ! C, where C is any positive
constant, is not compatible with an equilibrium path in the long run either. In this case, lim
t!1
Vt = 1
and lim
t!1
Tt =1. This implies that
lim
t!1
↵ o
1  
Tt
= 0 (54)
lim
t!1
↵ (Vt+o)
1  
Tt
=
1
1 . (55)
By L’Hopital’s rule,
lim
t!1
↵
(Vt + o)
1  
Tt
= lim
t!1
↵
(1  ) V˙tVt 
V
  1
 
t +oV
  1
 
t
! 
T˙t
(56)
where either T˙t = ↵R0, if Rt = R0, or lim
t!1
T˙t ! ↵C, if Rt ! C. In either case, the limit of the
denominator of (56) is a constant, and if we define B = {R0, C},
lim
t!1
↵
(Vt + o)
1  
Tt
=
1
B
lim
t!1
(1   ) V˙tVt✓
V
  1
 
t + oV
  1 
t
◆  (57)
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The denominator in (57) converges to zero. To determine the long run behavior of V˙tVt , first note
that
Vt =
n
✓
T
✓ 1
✓
t
1Z
t
e
 
sR
t
rx dx
(1   s + o)LsT
1 ✓
✓
s ds (58)
Define the integral in (58) as Jt ⌘
1R
t
e
 
sR
t
rx dx
(1    s + o)LsT
1 ✓
✓
s ds. Then the growth rate of Vt
can be expressed as
V˙t
Vt
=
✓   1
✓
T˙t
Tt
+
J˙t
Jt
(59)
with
J˙t
Jt
= rt   (1   t + o)LtT
1 ✓
✓
t
1R
t
e
 
sR
t
rx dx
(1   s + o)LsT
1 ✓
✓
s ds
= rt   (1   t + o)1R
t
(1   s + o)e[(n  )+ 1 ✓✓ g¯st r¯s t](s t) ds
.
(60)
This implies that
lim
t!1
J˙t
Jt
= r  
lim
t!1
(1   t + o)
1R
t
h
(1 + o)e[(n  )+
1 ✓
✓ g r](s t)   lim
t!1
 te[
g
✓ r](s t)
i
ds
= r  
lim
t!1
(1   t + o)
(1+o)
r (n  )  1 ✓✓ g
  limt!1  t
r  g✓
= r  
✓
r   (n   )  1  ✓
✓
g
◆
= n    + 1  ✓
✓
g,
(61)
since lim
t!1
 t = 0, and that the growth rate of the value of an innovation, equation (59), converges
to
lim
t!1
V˙t
Vt
=
✓   1
✓
g + (n   ) + 1  ✓
✓
g = n   . (62)
Plugging this result into equation (57), we find that if the measure of researchers either is a constant,
or converges to a constant, the left-hand side of equation (50) goes to infinity, under which condition the
entire population should engage in R&D, contradicting the assumption that the measure of researchers
is constant.
As the measure of researchers on an equilibrium path cannot go to zero and cannot be nor converge
to a constant, the measure must increase over time. Consider any gt ! g. Note, this includes exponen-
tially growing measures of researchers as well as measures of researchers that grow at rates lower than
exponentially. In this case,
T˙t = ↵Rt, (63)
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and Rt !1. The long run behavior of the left-hand side of (50) is again determined by the limit
behavior of (Vt+o)
1  
Tt
, but now also the derivatives of the numerator and the denominator go to infinity
in the limit. We make use of the following relationship:
↵
Tt
⇥
(Vt + o)
1     o1  ⇤ = (1 + o)1     o1   )
ln(↵)  ln(Tt) + ln[(Vt + o)1     o1  ] = ln[(1 + o)1     o1  ] )
  T˙t
Tt
+
(1   )(Vt + o)  V˙t
(Vt + o)1     o1   = 0 )
  T˙t
Tt
+ (1   )
V˙t
Vt
1 + oV  1t   o1  (V
  1
 
t + oV
  1 
t ) 
= 0 )
lim
t!1
  T˙t
Tt
+ (1   ) lim
t!1
V˙t
Vt
1 + oV  1t   o1  (V
  1
 
t + oV
  1 
t ) 
= 0
We know that T˙tTt ! g, that Vt ! 1 and that V˙tVt ! n   . Consequently, the only value of g that
does not contradict an equilibrium path on which both researchers and workers are active in the long
run is g = (1    )(n    ). Note that this also shows that Rt cannot grow at a rate below exponential
on an equilibrium path, as this would imply gt ! g = 0.
Case 2:   = 1
If   = 1, the condition for an optimal labor market allocation becomes
Rt =
8>><>>:
Lt if lim
t!1
↵ ln(Vt+o)
Tt
  lim
t!1
↵ ln(o)
Tt
> ln(1 + o)  ln(o)
2 [0, Lt] if lim
t!1
↵ ln(Vt+o)
Tt
  lim
t!1
↵ ln(o)
Tt
= ln(1 + o)  ln(o)
0 if lim
t!1
↵ ln(Vt+o)
Tt
  lim
t!1
↵ ln(o)
Tt
< ln(1 + o)  ln(o)
(64)
For any path of researchers such that Tt ! 1, an optimal labor market allocation in the long run
requires that
lim
t!1
↵ ln(Vt + o)
Tt
= ln(1 + o)  ln(o) (65)
And the left-hand side of (65) can be evaluated, similar to the case where   < 1, by applying
L’Hopital’s rule:
lim
t!1
↵ ln(Vt + o)
Tt
= ↵ lim
t!1
V˙t
Vt
1+oV 1t
T˙t
(66)
We know that lim
t!1
V˙t
Vt
1+oV 1t
= n    , and that lim
t!1
T˙t = ↵Rt. This implies that (65) cannot hold
if gt ! g > 0. It can hold, however, if either Rt = R0 or Rt ! C > 0. In this case, if we again let
B ⌘ {R0, C}, we find that
lim
t!1
↵ ln(Vt + o)
Tt
=
n   
B
(67)
which is equal to ln(1+o)  ln(o) if B = n  ln(1+o) ln(o) . Which implies that only constant and positive
measures of researchers are compatible with optimal labor market allocation in the long run if   = 1.
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